Buffalo Law Review
Volume 6

Number 2

Article 55

1-1-1957

Real Property—Eminent Domain—Valuation
Gerald Baskey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerald Baskey, Real Property—Eminent Domain—Valuation, 6 Buff. L. Rev. 211 (1957).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol6/iss2/55

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
the intent of the parties is manifest, the easement will be sustained. 14 Where
a developer of land sells lots with reference to a map on which squares, parks,
or beaches are designated, and representations are made by the developer
that such areas are for the use of the owners, purchasers of such lots acquire
an easement therein by implication. 15
It appears from the fact that virtually no use was made of the premises
during the period in question that the Court is not so concerned with how
much use is required in order to determine if the easement be necessary,
but rather with giving effect to the grantor's intention and the grantee's
reasonable expectations. Such intentions and expectations become especially
apparent when in direct reference to a map or plot.
Eminent Domain-Valuation
Evaluation of property in eminent domain proceedings is a process of
weighing many variants and intangibles. Certain criteria and formulae have
been evolved in an effort to assist the courts in their determinations. One
method is "capitalizing the income", used frequently in rent-producing property cases. Here, the rental received is divided by a percentage representing
the prevailing local rate of return for the type of property involved. The
resultant figure represents the capital amount necessary to yield the same
amount of income to the claimant as he has been receiving in the past. To
illustrate, where six thousand dollars was the annual rate reserved and the
local rate of earning six per cent, one hundred thousand dollars would be
the appropriate award.
It should be dear that an increase in the rate employed will cause a
decrease in the capital sum and vice versa. The validity of the method is the
subject of dispute and has been variously characterized as: "one of the best
7
tests of value", 16 and "barely a rough guess".'
In In Re City of New York (Manhattan Tower),18 Special Term accepted
the capitalization sales of the City's expert in arriving at its award, although
expressing grave misgivings as to their correctness, stating that the award
was at least ten per cent greater than he would have given if the experts
14. WilZiamson, v. Salnw2o, 233 N. Y. 657, 135 N. E. 958 (1922).
15. Wilkinson v. Nassau Shores, 304 N. Y. 614, 107 N. E. 2d 93 (1951);
Williamson v. Salion, supra note 14; Erit Realty Corp. v. Sea Gates Ass'n., 259
N. Y. 466, 182 N. E. 85 (1932); White v. Moore, 161 App. Div. 400, 146 N. Y.'
Supp. 593 (2d D6p't 1914).
16. 5 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §19.2 (3d Ed. 1952).
17. JAHR, LAwV OF EMINENT DOMAIN §149 (1953).
18. 1 N. Y. 2d 428, 136 N. E. 2d 478 (1956).
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had not fixed such low rates. He, however, felt bound to accept their judgment in the matter.
The Appellate Division'9 revised the awards downward, stating, in a
per curiam opinion, that the rates used "did not duly consider the general
depreciated condition of the area". The Court of Appeals reinstated the
awards of Special Term, holding that the findings of the Appellate Division
were without support in the record. This was because the revised award when
expressed in terms of rate of return were in excess of the highest rate testified
to at the trial.
The power of the Appellate Division to revise the trial court's findings
whenever the evidence indicated a different award and not merely when an
erroneous theory was adopted below or a grossly excessive amount awarded,
was recognized. However, the revision must have support in the record. As
there was no testimony to any higher rate than that adopted by the Special
Term, it seemed clear to the majority that the appellate court had attempted to
impose their subjective judgment for that of the experts. As the statute limited
the trier of fact to a judicial consideration of the evidence, this was unjusti20
fiable.
Two dissenters point out that the lower court did not revise the rates
but only the awards. They suggest that the Appellate Division adopted a
method of evaluation other than that employed by the Special Term and
that the revised amounts had ample support if one considered the other evidence in the record. This assumption is based on an allusion in the opinion
below that revision was necessitated because Special Term did not give proper
weight to the "conflicting testimony".
As there was no conflict as
figures, the dissenters infer that
testimony in the case. The dissent
shared by the two lower courts, that

to rates which could justify the revised
the evidence in question was the other
seems to be the product of a conviction,
the experts had erred.

It is suggested that the trial court might have solved his dilemma, if
unsatisfied with the expert testimony before him, by calling in other experts
on his own motion. The right to do this is well recognized in this country. 2'
19.

286 App. Div. 821, 142 N. Y. S. 2d 333 (1st Dep't 1955).
ADMIN. CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §B 15-19.0.
21. State v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 169 Or. 1, 124 P 2d 524 (1942);
State v. Horne, 171 N. C. 787, 88 S. E. 433 (1916); O'Connor v. National Ice Co.
56 Super 410, 4 N. Y. Supp. 537, af'd., 121 N. Y. 662, 24 N. E. 1092 (1890); See
generally, 9 WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE §2484 (3d Ed. 1940).
20.

